"Ithaca": The dramatic struggle to stay in the euro, the Samaras "trap" and Konstantopoulou
Alexis Tsipras narrates in Ithaca — a 762‑page political thriller published by Gutenberg and released on 24 November 2025 — the dramatic episodes and backstage negotiations of his government's effort to keep Greece in the euro and exit the bailout memoranda. The book recounts confrontations with creditors, tensions with former political partners and attempts to secure international support during the crisis.
Confrontations with Schäuble, the IMF and changing rules
Tsipras describes fierce and typically unequal clashes with Wolfgang Schäuble and the IMF. He accuses Schäuble of acting as "the architect of Grexit" and of bypassing negotiation rules driven by personal motives for vindication. As an example, Tsipras says Schäuble demanded the transfer of €50 billion of Greek assets to a Luxembourg‑based vehicle — a proposal that nearly derailed a 17‑hour negotiation for a final agreement — and circulated a "poisonous non‑paper" that tried to predetermine the Eurogroup decision. According to Tsipras, these actions showed that the very rules creditors had repeatedly lectured Greece to respect were being ignored when convenient.
Renzi's rebuke of hardliners
Tsipras recalls Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi erupting at Eurogroup members who raised even minor grievances — such as about the reopening of public broadcaster ERT — during tense talks. Renzi reportedly stood up, removed his jacket and challenged them: were they really going to argue over how many programs a national broadcaster should run while they were heads of state?
Merkel's decisive but cautious role
Tsipras credits several international figures with supporting Greece’s effort, notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel. He depicts Merkel as tough in negotiations but unwilling to embrace Schäuble’s plan for Greece to leave the euro. Tsipras says Merkel resisted internal pressure and kept open "a window for compromise" with Athens.
Putin: "Make up with Merkel"
Describing his international outreach to secure financing, Tsipras reveals that Vladimir Putin bluntly advised him — in a June 2015 meeting in Saint Petersburg — to reach an agreement with the EU leadership: "Make it up with Merkel." According to Tsipras, Putin added that loans to Greece would have been wasted and that a negotiated settlement with Greece’s European partners was the practical path.
Obama’s phone call: the good and the bad news
Tsipras recounts a previously unpublished exchange with U.S. President Barack Obama in Brussels. Obama congratulated him on the referendum result and then warned that a powerful bloc sought to torpedo the negotiation to push Greece toward a national currency. Obama advised calm and assured U.S. monitoring and possible behind‑the‑scenes intervention if necessary. Tsipras presents this conversation as evidence that international support helped secure program financing and debt measures.
The Samaras "trap" and the emptied public coffers
On domestic fronts, Tsipras blames the preceding Samaras government for leaving no cash in the public coffers and for deliberately requesting a short extension of negotiations (to 28 February 2015), a move he says aimed to create a funding gap that would hamper the next government. He describes this conduct as cynical and lacking patriotism, arguing that some political opponents were willing to risk national chaos to bring down his administration. Tsipras says he recognized an intended "bankruptcy trap" tied to the early‑election process but chose to confront it politically — for example by refusing to back the presidential bid of Stavros Dimas, which he says would have contradicted his own commitments.
Varoufakis, parallel‑currency plans and pension "coupons"
Tsipras is critical of former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, accusing him of vanity, doctrinal zeal and pursuing a personal agenda that became an obstacle. He writes that Varoufakis proved "unsuitable" for delicate negotiations, antagonized other eurozone finance ministers, and at times behaved like a gambler or adventurer. Tsipras says he realized a dead end was approaching when Varoufakis proposed removing George Chouliarakis from negotiations as "too conciliatory."
Tsipras also alleges that, despite being told there would be no exit from the euro, Varoufakis discussed plans for a parallel currency and even paying pensioners with coupons. Tsipras quotes himself reacting incredulously — "How will we give coupons instead of pensions? We wouldn't last a day" — and says Varoufakis later suggested digital, mobile‑based alternatives, an idea Tsipras found impractical in 2015.
Zoi Konstantopoulou’s "self‑destructive intransigence"
Tsipras portrays then‑Parliament Speaker Zoi Konstantopoulou in particularly dark terms, calling her "self‑destructive," unpredictable and obsessive. He regrets supporting her candidacy for Speaker, saying she aligned with factions favoring exit from the euro and used her institutional role against the government's strategy.
Prokopis Pavlopoulos and assurances about the euro
Tsipras explains he proposed Prokopis Pavlopoulos for the presidency of the Republic because he trusted Pavlopoulos’s composure and sensitivity (noting his role as interior minister after the 2008 unrest). He recounts Pavlopoulos coming to the Maximos Mansion moved by the nomination and asking plainly: "Will we stay in the euro?" Tsipras says he reassured him: "Don't worry, Prokopis, we will stay."
Self‑criticism: "Olandreu" and "the euro is not a fetish"
Tsipras offers some admissions of error. He regrets using the epithet "Olandreu" in 2012 about then‑French president François Hollande — a phrase he says he borrowed from Jean‑Luc Mélenchon — and concedes he should have shown more restraint. He also acknowledges that defending Panagiotis Lafazanis's phrase "the euro is not a fetish" shortly before the 2012 repeat elections was a mistake, because the remark was isolated and amplified by media noise and later became a political burden.
Bitterness over attacks on his family and the Prespa allegation
Tsipras expresses deep hurt at personal attacks, especially claims by Kyriakos Mitsotakis that impugned his late father and insinuated past family ties to the junta. He says he was pained that political opponents would circulate a fabricated photo purportedly showing his father with Papadopoulos. Tsipras wrote a public letter to restore the family’s honor, he says, not to answer slander but to honor his parents’ memory.
Regarding the Prespa Agreement, Tsipras condemns attacks that accused him of "trading Macedonia for pensions" and says he was astonished at how low political discourse sank when that falsehood was invented and propagated.
